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Phillips v. City of Whitefish; Legislative or Administrative, that is 
the Referendum Question  
Michelle Tafoya  
 I. INTRODUCTION  
 
 Under Montana law, the power of citizens to repeal local 
government resolutions by referendum extends only to legislative acts.1 
In Phillips v. City of Whitefish,2 the Montana Supreme Court held that a 
resolution amending an interlocal agreement between the City of 
Whitefish and Flathead County was an administrative act, despite the 
legislative nature of the original interlocal agreement.3 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 This case stems from a local control and land use dispute 
between the City of Whitefish, Flathead County, and the citizens of both 
caught in between. The City of Whitefish has implemented several 
regulatory policies to protect its vibrant downtown, highway corridors, 
and pristine natural resources, considered vital to its tourism and 
recreation based economy.4 In contrast, Flathead County’s much more 
permissive land-use planning scheme has resulted in a hodgepodge of 
subdivisions, big-box stores, mini-storage facilities, billboards, and 
stream and lakeshore setbacks.5  
 In 1967, Flathead County and the City of Whitefish created a 
joint planning board whereby the county agreed to cede its planning 
authority to the city for the one mile extraterritorial area (ETA), 
otherwise known as the “donut,” surrounding Whitefish.6 In 2005, the 
two parties not only formalized this relationship with an interlocal 
agreement (2005 IA), but also extended Whitefish’s ETA to two miles.7 
This agreement was mutually beneficial for both parties: the 2005 IA 
enabled the county to save financial resources by abdicating its planning 
responsibilities in the donut, and the city was given the opportunity to 
define and protect the area’s unique character.  
 As part of this goal, Whitefish adopted the very controversial 
Critical Areas Ordinance (CAO) in 2008, “which imposed zoning 
restrictions in the donut to protect lakes, streams, wetlands, and drainage 
                                           
1. Mont. Code Ann. § 7–5–131 (2013); Town of Whitehall v. Preece, 956 P.2d 743 (Mont. 1998).  
2. Phillips v. City of Whitefish, 330 P.3d 442 (Mont. 2014). 
3. Id. at 445–446. 
4. Appellant’s Opening Br., Phillips v. City of Whitefish, http://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/search/ 
getDocument?documentid=77004 at 11 (No. DA 13–0472, 330 P.3d 442 (2014)). 
5. Id.  
6. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 445–446. 
7. Id. at 446.  
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areas from development.”8 The county opposed the CAO and, upon its 
adoption by the city, voted to unilaterally withdraw from the 2005 IA.9 
Since the 2005 IA expressly stated that the agreement could only be 
terminated by mutual consent of the parties, the City of Whitefish filed a 
lawsuit to enforce the agreement.10 The district court refused to do so, 
finding the 2005 IA unenforceable.11 On appeal, the Montana Supreme 
Court reversed the district court’s ruling, imposed a preliminary 
injunction to prevent Flathead County from exercising planning authority 
in donut, and remanded the case for trial.12  
 The parties then entered into negotiations to see if a settlement 
could be reached.13 After eight months and several public meetings, the 
parties negotiated a 2010 interlocal agreement (2010 IA) that: (1) 
allowed for unilateral termination as long as the terminating party gave 
one year’s notice and agreed to participate in alternative dispute 
resolution; and (2) was subject to renewal by both parties after five 
years.14 Most Whitefish residents were opposed to the 2010 IA: however, 
despite the “substantial objection from almost all of the persons who 
spoke in public on the matter,” the Whitefish City Council passed 
Resolution 10–46, adopting the 2010 IA on November 15, 2010.15 At the 
same meeting, the council also adopted Resolution 10–47 which 
“authorized the City to seek dismissal of the 2008 lawsuit.”16 Flathead 
County followed suit and the lawsuit was dismissed on July 11, 2011.17 
 Dissatisfied with the city’s approval of Resolution 10–46, both 
Whitefish and donut residents decided to take action.18 By January 2011, 
a referendum petition to repeal the resolution was approved under state 
law form and compliance standards.19 By April 2011, citizens had 
gathered the required signatures and the Flathead County Election 
Department certified the referendum for the November election.20 
Finally, after over ten months of citizen effort, Resolution 10–46 passed 
by a two-to-one margin on November 8, 2011.21  
 Failing at the ballot box, the plaintiffs in this case filed a lawsuit 
in Flathead District Court to challenge the referendum’s validity. The 
plaintiffs argued that the referendum sought to repeal an administrative 
                                           
8. Id.  
9. Id.  
10. City of Whitefish v. Bd. of Co. Commrs. of Flathead Co. ex rel. Brenneman, 199 P.3d 201, 203 
(Mont. 2008).  
11. Id.  
12. Id. at 208.  
13. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 446.  
14. Id.  
15. Appellant’s Opening Br., supra n. 4, at 12. 
16. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 446–447.  
17. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 447.  
18 . Id.  
19. Id.  
20. Id. 
21. Id.  
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action, rather than a legislative action and, as such, the citizens’ 
referenda power did not extend to Resolution 10–46.22 Co-defendants, 
the City of Whitefish and the Flathead County Commissioners, 
responded immediately with breach of contract claims against each other 
with respect to the 2005 and 2010 IAs.23 Additionally, the district court 
granted a motion to intervene for four citizens and the “Let Whitefish 
Vote” ballot committee (Intervenors).24 The Intervenors argued that the 
plaintiff’s suit should be dismissed because the claim was untimely under 
MCA 7–5–135(1) and the doctrine of laches.25  
 On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held 
that: (1) the suit was timely under Montana law; and (2) Resolution 10–
46 was an administrative act and thus not eligible for repeal by 
referendum.”26 The district court did not separately address the doctrine 
of laches claim.27 Both the City of Whitefish and the Intervenors 
appealed.28    
 
III. MAJORITY OPINION 
 
 In a 4–3 opinion, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the 
district court’s grant of summary judgement and separately addressed the 
laches argument.29 First, the majority held that the plaintiff’s referendum 
challenge was timely under MCA 7–5–135(1).30 The statute provides that 
“a governing body” may initiate a suit to determine the validity and 
constitutionality of proposed initiative or referendum “within 14 days of 
the date a petition has been approved as to form.”31 However, the Court 
pointed out that the statute’s plain meaning does not apply to non-
government parties that choose to initiate an action, such as the private 
citizen plaintiffs in this case.32   
 The Court then held that the plaintiff’s claim was not untimely 
under the doctrine of laches.33 The Court cited Cole v. State ex rel. 
Brown34 as an instance where this equitable doctrine successfully barred 
a claim: in that case, the plaintiffs tried and failed to challenge an 
initiative that had passed nine years earlier.35 The Court noted that, 
unlike the Intervenors in this case, the argument was effective in Cole 
                                           
22. Id.  
23. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 447.  
24. Appellant’s Opening Br., supra n. 4, at 15.  
25. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 447.  
26. Id. at 447–448.  
27. Id. at 447.  
28. Id. at 448.  
29. Id. at 449–450, 456.  
30. Id. at 449. 
31. Mont. Code Ann. § 7–5–135(1) (2013).  
32. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 448–449.  
33. Id. at 450.  
34. Cole v. State ex rel. Brown, 42 P.3d 760 (Mont. 2002).  
35. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 449; Cole, 42 P.3d 760 (emphasis added).  
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because the defendants addressed the laches prejudice requirement, 
specifically regarding those who relied on the “presumptive validity” of 
the initiative.36 Finally, the Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that 
Resolution 10–46 was an administrative, rather than a legislative, act by 
the City of Whitefish and thus was not subject to the referendum 
process.37 Applying the Whitehall factors the Court adopted from the 
Kansas Supreme Court in 1998,38 the majority held that the factors 
weighed in favor of administrative action: namely that “the decision to 
enter the 2010 IA and resolve the 2008 lawsuit, with limited assurances 
about the ultimate duration and outcome of the agreement, was a 
decision that required specialized knowledge and experience of the 
City’s fiscal and other affairs.”39 The Court did not address whether 
either interlocal agreement was valid under Montana law.40  
 
IV. DISSENTING OPINION 
 
 While Chief Justice Mike McGrath and Justices Patricia Cotter 
and Michael Wheat concurred with the majority on the statutory and 
doctrine of laches timeliness issues, they dissented regarding the nature 
of the City’s action and, consequently, the citizens’ right to repeal the 
action by referendum.41 The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s 
continued use of the “vague, confusing, and awkward to apply” 
Whitehall factors, and instead advocated for a fact-driven, case-by-case 
approach “guided by underlying principles of separation of powers and 
historical examples of legislative powers.”42 Using this and the Whitehall 
approach, the dissent determined that Resolution 10–46 was plainly 
legislative because the 2010 IA created zoning authority and “since 
adoption of a zoning ordinance would be a legislative act, it follows that 
an act granting such authority must also be a legislative act.”43 
Additionally, the dissent argued that since the resolution entailed 
significant policy changes and the 2005 IA was certainly a legislative act, 





                                           
36. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 449–450.  
37. Id. at 456.  
38. Town of Whitehall, 956 P.2d at 749.  
39. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 452, 456. 
40. Id. at 453 (stating that “we are not deciding in this case whether zoning authority was the proper 
subject of an interlocal agreement”).  
41. Id. at 456 (McGrath, C.J. & Cotter & Wheat, JJ., dissenting).  
42. Id. at 456–457.  
43. Id. at 458.  
44. Id.  
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A. The Plaintiff’s referendum challenge was timely under Mont. Code 
Ann. 7–5–135(1) and the doctrine of laches 
 
 As a threshold matter, it seems clear that the Court correctly 
upheld its mandate to “neither insert what has been omitted, nor omit 
what has been inserted” with regard to the majority’s plain language 
interpretation of Mont. Code Ann. 7–5–135(1).45 While the statute places 
a time restriction of 14 days on any “governing body” that wants to file 
suit to determine the validity and constitutionality of a petition and 
proposed action, no statute bars a citizen or group of citizens from filing 
such a challenge.46  
 The Court’s holding regarding the laches claim also seems 
consistent with prior case law and the doctrine’s generally disfavored 
status as a defense.47 While the less than vigilant plaintiffs in this case 
had several months to challenge the referendum and inexplicably chose 
to do so only after citizens had voted strongly in favor of it, the Court has 
nevertheless indicated that it will only bar such a claim in extreme 
situations, such as those found in Cole. It is well established that 
“[l]aches is not a mere matter of elapsed time”: a showing of prejudice is 
also required.48 However, without a sufficiently long passage of time, it 
seems unlikely that a party will be able to demonstrate the facts 
necessary to establish prejudice. Here, the Intervenors could only 
demonstrate the effort they had put into the election process, not how 
they had subsequently relied on the referendum’s validity.49 In any case, 
both the majority and dissent were unwilling to establish precedent they 
viewed as “tantamount to requiring all challenges to a ballot measure be 
brought prior to election.”50   
 
B. Resolution 10–46 was a legislative act and subject to voter 
referendum 
 
 Under Montana law, the people have the right to repeal 
legislative acts through the referendum process, including ordinances and 
resolutions enacted by their local government.51 However, local 
governmental powers extend not only to legislative acts, but also to 
administrative and quasi-judicial acts.52 Thus, the people may only 
                                           
45. Mont. Code. Ann. § 1–2–101.  
46. Mont. Code Ann. § 7–5–135(1).  
47. Cole, 42 P.3d at 763–764; 30A C.J.S. Laches, Stale Demands, and Limitations § 138 (WL current 
through Mar. 2015). 
48. In re Est. of Wallace v. McAlear, 606 P.2d 136 (Mont. 1980); 27A Am. Jur. 2d Laches; Lapse of 
time; Stale Demands § 163 (WL current through Feb. 2015).  
49. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 449 (majority).  
50. Id.  
51. Mont. Const. art. V, § 1; Mont. Const. art. III, § 5(1); Mont. Const. art. XI, § 8; Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 7–5– 131. 
52. Mont. Const. art. XI, § 4.  
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invoke their referenda power to repeal local government resolutions and 
ordinances that are legislative in nature.53 In practice, courts have found 
it difficult to distinguish a legislative act from an administrative act due 
to their overlapping characteristics.54  
 In Town of Whitehall v. Preece, the Montana Supreme Court 
adopted four factors from the Kansas Supreme Court to guide the process 
of classifying local government actions.55 Demonstrating the difficultly 
of applying these factors, both the majority and dissent applied each 
factor in their analysis and came to opposite conclusions on every one. 
The majority, while underscoring the fourth factor’s cautionary language 
that “no one act of a governing body is likely to be solely administrative 
or legislative” and explaining that “these cases are not black and white,” 
nevertheless decided to restrain the people’s power in this case because 
they viewed the referendum as lacking a “fully legislative purpose.”56 
The dissent, on the other hand, pointed out that: (1) the Kansas Supreme 
Court recently discarded this fourth factor policy statement because it did 
not help that court evaluate specific facts; and (2) the remaining factors 
are “confusing, and can unreasonably restrict the voters’ right to 
participate in the referendum process.”57 These three factors are 
discussed in turn. 
 The first Whitehall factor essentially states that a legislative act 
is a new law that is permanent and general, while an administrative act 
executes an already existing law and is thus temporary and limited in 
effect.58 The majority found dispositive that Resolution 10–46 was an 
amendment to an interlocal agreement, rather than a zoning ordinance, 
and that the unilateral termination and renewal provisions provided for 
only potential changes to the City’s authority to zone the donut.59 First, it 
is important to note that legislative acts can, and often do, take the form 
of amendments. Additionally, as the dissent pointed out, the Montana 
legislature “periodically enacts statutes that will expire on a certain date 
or become effective only upon the happening of a certain event.”60 Thus, 
the 2010 IA’s amendatory nature and termination and renewal provisions 
don’t seem to provide a sound basis to categorize Resolution 10–46 as an 
administrative act under this factor.  
 The second Whitehall factor ostensibly weighs an act’s policy 
objectives.61 Under this factor, if an action declares and provides the 
                                           
53. Mont. Code Ann. § 7–5–131. 
54. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 451.  
55. Town of Whitehall, 956 P.2d at 749.  
56. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 451, 456 (majority).  
57. Id. at 456 (McGrath, C.J. & Cotter & Wheat, JJ., dissenting).  
58. Id. at 451, 453 (majority).  
59. Id. at 453.  
60. Id. at 456 (McGrath, C.J. & Cotter & Wheat, JJ., dissenting).  
61. Id. at 451 (majority).  
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means to implement a public purpose, it is legislative.62 If, on the other 
hand, the action addresses only a narrow segment of a larger policy 
question, it is likely administrative.63 The majority reasoned that since 
the 2010 IA only constituted a “few” amendments to the 2005 IA and 
since these provision were conditional, the 2010 IA only had the 
potential to lead to future policy changes.64 The dissent, while at the 
same time questioning the veracity of the factor overall, also explained 
that the Montana Legislature frequently enacts legislation that addresses 
larger policy questions.65 The dissent also did not find the amendatory 
nature of Resolution 10-46 relevant since the “Montana Legislature 
routinely enacts statutes which are clearly legislative acts, but which are 
amended in future years in ways large or small.”66 Resolution 10–46 
contained two amendments that constituted a substantial policy shift for 
the City’s zoning authority simply because the goals aimed at protecting 
the City’s downtown, highway corridors, and natural resources became 
subject to Flathead County’s inherent threat of future termination under 
the 2010 IA. Since the certainty and autonomy that once existed under 
the 2005 IA was, in effect, eviscerated by the 2010 IA, Resolution 10–46 
was a legislative act.   
 Finally, the third Whitehall factor states that “[d]ecisions which 
require specialized training and experience in municipal government and 
intimate knowledge of the fiscal and other affairs of a city in order to 
make a rational choice may properly be characterized as administrative, 
even though they may also be said to involve the establishment of a 
policy.”67 It is conceded that the decision to settle a lawsuit is an 
administrative act because it requires specialized expertise and 
discretionary judgement.68 However, as the dissent stated, “[w]hile the 
decision to settle the lawsuit per se may be administrative, it was 
undertaken in the separate Resolution 10–47.”69 While the majority 
opinion spent much of its opinion rationalizing how Resolution 10-46 
was inextricably tied and sufficiently related to Resolution 10-47, it 
seems clear that, in this instance, the Court overlooked its obligation to 
“neither insert what has been omitted, nor omit what has been inserted” 
when it mistakenly interpreted Resolution 10-46 as Resolution 10–47.70  
 However, on a broader scale, it is hard to comprehend why the 
majority continued to rely on the Kansas-adopted Whitehall factors 
when, in Kansas, “[t]here is no independent, constitutional right to an 
                                           
62. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 451, 453.  
63. Id.  
64. Id. at 454.  
65. Id. at 456 (McGrath, C.J. & Cotter & Wheat, JJ., dissenting).  
66. Id. at 457.  
67. Id. at 451 (majority).  
68. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 454.  
69. Id. at 457 (McGrath, C.J. & Cotter & Wheat, JJ., dissenting).  
70. Id. at 451–452, 454–455 (majority); Mont. Code. Ann. § 1–2–101.  
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initiative; any authority to hold a referendum must come from the 
legislature.”71 The Kansas referendum and initiative process is only 
authorized in statute and the courts have strictly applied it when judging 
the administrative or legislative nature of a petition.72 As a result, “[i]n 
Kansas, the initiative and referendum process under K.S.A. 12–3013 has 
long been judged on a more demanding basis than in some other 
locales.”73 
 In Montana, “[t]he people reserve to themselves the powers of 
initiative and referendum.”74 This power extends to legislative actions of 
local government.75 In contrast to Kansas, these rights are reflected, but 
not created, in statute.76 If Montana is to follow the “principle that 
initiative and referendum provisions of the Constitution should be 
broadly construed to maintain the maximum power in the people,”77 we 
should not be following Kansas’s framework that has self-admittedly 
“never adopted a ‘liberal’ view of the matters which should be subject to 
initiative and referendum, but quite the contrary.”78 
 The majority opinion correctly pointed out that “all actions of a 
state legislature are inherently legislative by their very nature.”79 As 
such, it follows that if a local government act is sufficiently analogous to 
a state legislative act, it should be deemed a legislative act. It is time to 
dispense with the Whitehall factors and replace them with the simpler 
case-by-case, fact-driven approach advocated for by the dissent and used 
in other jurisdictions with similar constitutional provisions as those 
found in Montana.80 Only then will the Court be able to more accurately 
identify and separate legislative acts from administrative acts, and more 
broadly, ensure that Montana’s constitutional guarantee to initiative and 
referendum is secure and available for citizens to challenge their 
government. 
 
                                           
71. City of Topeka v. Imming, 344 P.3d 957, 967 (Kan. App. 2015). 
72. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12–3013 (2014); McAlister v. City of Fairway, 212 P.3d 184, 193–194 (Kan. 
2009). 
73. McAlister, 212 P.3d at 193. 
74 Mont. Const. art. V, § 1.  
75. Mont. Const. art. III, § 5(1); Mont. Const. art. XI, § 8. 
76. Mont. Code Ann. § 7–5–131.  
77. Chouteau Co. v. Grossman, 563 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Mont. 1977). 
78. City of Lawrence v. McArdle, 522 P.2d 420, 427 (Kan. 1974). 
79. Phillips, 330 P.3d at 455 (majority).  
80. See e.g. Vagneur v. City of Aspen, 295 P.3d 493 (Colo. 2013); Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(9) 
(guaranteeing that “[t]he initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people by this section are 
hereby further reserved to the registered electors of every city, town, and municipality as to all local, 
special, and municipal legislation of every character in or for their respective municipalities”). 
  
